In Egypt, there is no policy of industrialization, or of revisiting previous economic policies to achieve sustainable development and an equitable distribution of income. The main negotiation it undertook with the IMF in January concerned the further development of a market economy, tourism and foreign direct investments.
There have been no negotiations concerning industrialization or problems associated with the informal market in Egypt. Good Governance In theory, both the Washington and post-Washington Consensus advocated structural adjustment measures with an enhancement of the rule of law and good governance.
The problems with this 3. The Political Economy of Arab Uprisings neoliberal project are manifold and widely criticized in development circles, especially with the onset of the Latin American and South East Asian financial crises, but mostly with the global financial crisis of The goal of the following paragraphs is not to concentrate on the problems of neoliberalism per se, but rather to analyze the failure of Arab regimes to abide by the whole neoliberal project advocating good governance and the rule of law.
Arab regimes initiated the economic aspects of the neoliberal project to embed authoritarianism, rather than to reform the market. However, this illusion of political liberalization and good governance could not stand in the face of ever larger public criticism of Arab regimes, especially in middle- and lower-income economies like Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. Voice and accountability, rule of law and transparency in the Arab region have been rated as either the worst or second worst in the world Kaufmann et al.
In the Arab world, this indicator is ranked the worst in the world Kaufmann et al. Even though civil society organizations have increased in number and are estimated to be almost , in the whole region, they have been used by the Arab states to impede democratization, and to show a feigned democracy to the international community. Arab governments, mainly in middle and lower ranked economies, have consistently promoted civil society organizations that promote social services to fill the gaps the government is not able to fill in terms of education, healthcare, and services.
On the other hand, civil society organizations that promote human rights or entertain any political discourse have remained rather weak as a democratizing force in the Arab region because they face severe government interventions and serious hostility. Arab regimes have been intervening in labour and other syndicates to increase government domination over society. Funding civil society organizations is highly restricted, and has to be approved first by governments. Ministries of the interior have the right to investigate staff of civil society organizations and reject the creation of certain NGOs, especially human rights organizations.
For instance, in Gaza, civil society organizations have to submit personal biographies of their founding members to the interior ministry. In Jordan, security forces scrutinize all civil society actors, especially NGO volunteers Hawthorne, Almost all Arab countries have written constitutions that set out the main legal and institutional principles of separation of power, the judiciary, individual freedoms, and equality before the law.
Nevertheless, the gap between what is written and what is practised is wide. The executive branch dominates all other branches of governance in all Arab countries. Citizens have very limited venues for participation, and civil and political rights are constrained by the highly coercive intelligence services prevalent in the region.
A state of emergency is in place in many countries to date, and many states have anti-terrorism laws that expanded the role of government and intelligence 13 PAPERSIEMed. Hence, the judiciary is not effective in implementing the laws, and is regarded as another branch of the executive. Institutions, such as courts, laws and the independence of the judiciary, are not as important as networks of interests, which reproduce corruption.
These indicators according to the World Bank are as follows: political stability, government effectiveness, participation and accountability, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness and equity. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index , Arab countries are amongst the lowest ranked in the world, with Somalia being the worst classified, at nd in the index of countries.
The neoliberal development project and its implementation in the Arab region led to GDP growth and to higher human capital at the expense of good governance and the rule of law. Hence, the social problems associated with the neoliberal reform project manifested in monetary and austerity measures were forcefully implemented, while the positive socio-political aspects of good governance and the rule of law were widely neglected in the region.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, the worst-ranking country is number , Somalia, and the best is num- ber 1, New Zealand. On the contrary, state bureaucracy was soon to turn into a politicized structure far from being a technocratic one, as in the case of the Asian Tigers whose state is typically developmentalist.
The dominant form of the social contract developed in the region was one where the population resigned itself to a lack of political freedom in exchange for the provision of certain services, like state employment, access to public healthcare and education, and exemption from or low taxation.
Nevertheless, with the stagnation of development and productivity, by the end of the s these lower and middle-income countries faced grave problems. This is when the adoption of neoliberal economic measures was enforced by the World Bank and the IMF.
The prevailing social contract within the region has come under pressure since the s, but more so in the s due to increasing inability of the state to co-opt the educated youth into the public sector.
The public sector used to be a relatively well-paid civil service that acted as a mechanism for upward social mobility. In country after country, the public sector is no longer able to absorb the increasing numbers of graduates produced by the education systems. Structural adjustment measures have resulted in a decline in both the real income of government employees and a decline in government expenditure on social services.
This is coupled with the increasing privatization of social services without guarantees of quantity or quality. The system of large-scale subsidies that was offered on a range of essential goods became difficult to maintain, and led to bread riots in a number of countries in the s and s.
The lack of universal social security coverage and of equitable access to property and to the justice system has exacerbated social and economic exclusion of wide segments of the poor and the lower middle classes Bush, ; Kassem, The case of Egypt is revealing in that the percentage of food and fuel subsidies of the GDP rose as a result of their increasing worldwide prices, and the government increased transportation, electricity and communication prices Farah, The prevailing economic structure of the region, based on neoliberalism, along with rising population numbers, led to a rupture in the socio-economic structure of the region.
The market could not absorb the increasing number of employable bodies. Life expectancy rates and education increased at a higher percentage than the rest of the developing regions in the world.
Together with the high population growth there was an increase in literacy and education levels. For instance, in Egypt literacy rates increased from For example, in Egypt the percentage of tertiary educated graduates increased from 20 to 40 percent and university graduates increased from 20 to 30 percent over this period Assaad, Higher education rates did not mean higher employment levels; on the contrary, in most Arab countries they meant fewer chances of employment. In Egypt, individuals educated at post- secondary levels constitute almost 80 percent of the unemployed.
In Morocco, they constitute By contrast, jobs generated in the public sector dropped from one third to 15 percent during the same time Assaad, It is evident that increasing literacy rates were not met with employment opportunities. Unemployment rates skyrocketed amongst youth, reaching 23 percent in the MENA region: the highest youth unemployment rates in the world ILO, According to the Arab Human Development Report , there is a need to create almost 51 million employment opportunities by to decrease the unemployment problem in the Arab World UNDP, According to recent studies, the share of middle-level employment declined in the private sector.
Concentrating the private sector on tourism, services and transport established the dichotomy of either low-skilled and low-paid jobs, or high-skilled and high-paid jobs Springborg, The higher unemployment rates resulted from the erosion of the middle class. From the s until the s, government employment mostly absorbed the middle-class technocrats, but the erosion of government employment was not replaced by the private sector.
The employability capacity of the private sector is far below the rise in the employable population Springborg, In Egypt, public sector employment remained at 5. Unemployment in the GCC is amongst the lowest in the region, ranging from 1. However, unemployment in Saudi Arabia was almost 6. A third of the population in the GCC is under sixteen years, with population growth reaching almost 7. The whole national population growth in the GCC is almost 3. Even though unemployment is lower in the GCC, unemployment amongst national youth is high in this region.
In Qatar, unemployment is almost 70 percent, and in Bahrain it is estimated to be 54 percent Saif, For instance, GCC economies rely mainly on the oil sector which is capital intensive and does not have the capability to generate high employment levels.
Moreover, the fluctuation of oil prices led to a weak investment climate in the GCC, leading to less job creation. Thus, the private non-oil sector has limited capability of generating employment opportunities amongst the GCC nationals. In addition, the private sector, which has perceived high levels of privatizations throughout the past decades, is underdeveloped, dependent on patron-client relations between the state and businesses, which hinders the absorption of employees Saif and Khalek, It is clear that youths constitute the largest segment of Arab populations, yet are highly marginalized, especially in the employment market.
Youths are also marginalized in the political sphere, where the dominant political parties, especially in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, consisted of business tycoons and individuals who had direct contact with the rulers.
The Political Economy of Arab Uprisings connections more than initiative and innovation and is based on long-standing ruling groups. Income inequalities and social exclusion have been on the rise throughout the past decade. Wealth inequality has been increasing, with wealth and assets concentrated in the hands of a select few.
For instance, studies have shown that in the MENA area, income inequality in the industrial sector has incremented since the s. However, it increased dramatically between and , with Egypt being an extreme case Henry and Springborg, The problem facing countries in the transitional phase, like Egypt and Tunisia, is the extent to which new policies will be able to include the highly excluded youth and middle-class citizens into the socio-political sphere.
One year after the ousting of Mubarak and Ben Ali, not much has changed to include these segments of society in both the economic and political spheres.
In Egypt, where the transition period is facing more tumult than in Tunisia, youths have not been incorporated into the interim government, very few youths were elected to the interim parliament, and middle-class exclusion is still widespread. The interim government did not advance policy options, which would increase youth employment levels, and no plans of social inclusion or rural upgrading have been initiated thus far. Regimes strove to develop legitimacy by mobilizing different segments of the citizenry against the old oligarchies that were aligned with colonial powers.
These developed a type of populist authoritarian regime that remained largely intact for much of the past half century Hinnebusch, Arab regimes consistently gathered their societies against Israel and the United States, and advanced redistributive rights for the peasants and the poor until the s.
These measures increased their legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens Hinnebusch, Syria, for instance, advanced this populist legacy until the beginning of the popular uprisings in March Arab regimes were also consolidated through the military and the expansion of state bureaucracy.
Hence, according to Hinnebusch, authoritarian regimes in the region were able to control social and structural power centres in the region. First, personalist leaders hegemonized the ruling elite by basing their trust in the system of certain sects, kin, or classes, increasing nepotism. This report explores the challenges artists have faced since the Arab uprisings, U. Employing an engaging question-and-answer format, The Arab Uprisings explores the revolutionary protests that have rocked the Arab world since late In this updated and revised second edition, James L.
Gelvin explores the varied paths taken by the uprisings and assesses their historical and global significance. Gelvin begins with an overview-What. Since , the Middle East has experienced a double trend of chaos and civil war, on the one hand, and the return of authoritarianism, on the other.
That convergence has eclipsed the political transitions that occurred in the countries whose regimes were toppled in , as if they were merely footnotes to. The Arab uprisings have put Lebanon under increased strain. While the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt caused limited reverberations, the war in Syria echoed in the fine-tuned political and confessional balance of Lebanon.
From nonviolent protests in Cairo and Manama to the ousting of Libya's Gaddafi and the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, the series of uprisings which swept through the Middle East and North Africa from late have been burdened with the collective hopes and expectations of the world. Western supporters. Routines and. The Invisible Arab traces the roots of the revolutions in the Arab world. We must acknowledge the sheer courage of the demonstrators whose actions put an end to an intellectually bankrupt thesis called "Arab Exceptionalism".
They were spontaneous national eruptions, although they have not remained solely national nor solely Arab as was the case with Libya, and Syria today. But not only that. We also see an interdependence and connectedness between them. Foreign interventions in the Arab uprisings have had primarily negative consequences and helped radicalize conflicts. They distorted the initial impulse for reform. Moreover, international actors continue to pursue the same destructive policies.
Both co-chairs expressed the hope that the conference will inform future insights into otherwise hard-to-decipher internal and external dimensions of the uprisings. All transformations take time, added Faris: Despite worrisome trends, in the long run the uprisings may lead to more democratic conditions for people in the Middle East and Arab countries.
While the experience of each country is inevitably different, the conference traced commonalities in the struggle to recapture political order, address economic distress, and redefine national identities in the midst of continuing political and societal strife.
Specific attention was devoted to the role of youth, women, external actors, and the old guard in the post- revolutionary context. Personally, I find it an affectation when people Gilbert Achcar insist on being called Dr. Roger Owen A. Pelletreau Former U. The scholars identified patrimonialism and over-centralized governance as major challenges to achieving political and economic freedom.
The decline of the middle class, cuts in public services, corrupt elections, and the lack of institutional development all warrant concern about the viability of democratic change.
Overall, panelists challenged the audience to confront worrisome realities as well as trends in public mood in North Africa and the Middle East about the difficulties of achieving freedom and dignity politically, socially, and economically.
Asked by one conference participant whether the UN Security Council would call on armed foreigners to leave Syria, Manna replied that Russia and China have only agreed to the proposal while the United States and United Kingdom have agreed to this idea in principle only.
The first problem: Egypt contends with an entrenched military-security apparatus that has penetrated state and administrative bodies, a situation that has changed little since the s, he said. With no effective civilian oversight, the army enjoys veto rights, the government accepts the military-security budget as one figure, and military tribunals predominate.
He would like counterbalance through an independent judiciary and a powerful legislative branch of government. Those countries that won independence during the s and s established programs of public provisioning such as jobs, schooling, and health care; infant mortality decreased and educational literacy increased.
There is an increasing concentration of business elites around market-oriented reforms that disadvantage the poor and middle class. Such reforms have led to hiring freezes and wage cuts in vital public employment along with attendant declines in educational and health quality.
In Egypt, for example, citizens are theoretically entitled to medical care but oftentimes clinic hours are erratic and doctors do not come to work.
It is thus crucial to consider how public perceptions and public mood affect politics. The bottom line: If policy makers want to quell the revolution, they must take more seriously welfare regime reform. Corruption further stymied social justice and the redistribution of wealth.
Nonetheless, he reminded participants that democracy needs time to establish and youth should be supported because they have the potential to change Egypt for the better. Murphy reminded the audience that Saudi Arabia uses its wealth to effectively buy the consent of a largely complacent population, and the government is increasingly intolerant of dissent.
Unlike other Arab youth, young Saudis value safety and security over revolutionary change. They greatly admire the House of Saud and King Abdullah, and feel ambivalent about elections because elections could lead to strife.
Murphy argued that there is no critical mass of youth to threaten the Saudi government. However, the situation could change in the coming years. She sees a more polarized Saudi society emerging in the future, one side progressive, the other inward-looking and conservative. While no significant pressures for reform are imminent, widening opportunities for international education and for self-expression on the Internet show promise for opening Saudi Arabian society, Murphy continued. In addition, she said, Saudi Arabia is experiencing its largest ever youth bulge with children and young people comprising about 60 percent of the population.
To employ them the government needs to create 6 million jobs by She also noted that the Saudi regime is concerned about the potential radicalization of its youth. In response to a question about whether the Saudi government thinks about the possible impact of study-abroad programs, Murphy said the societal impact is less concerning than radicalization and thus the country will soon need more job-training programs because its oil reserves are decreasing.
Saudi Arabia is no longer as isolated as it used to be. Young people with cell phones are constantly connected to one another even at home with their families. As Saudi citizens they are more likely to raise questions about the world. They also say the Internet has given them a new level of freedom of speech.
They feel quite invested in social media, even creating satirical videos about the Saudi government. In addition, Murphy found in her interviews that young Saudis are religious: While they want Saudi Arabia to remain committed to Islam, they prefer less state-enforced religion and show more respect for religious differences. This change may eventually pose a threat to the clerical establishment. Absent the achievement of marriage, young Arabs turn to demonstrations to express frustrations brought on in part by their inability to prove themselves as adults, she argued.
Several factors conspire to delay marriage opportunities: increasing bride prices, the desire of young people to marry for love, and a lack of job opportunities and affordable housing. At the same time, however, family structures have also been undergoing major change with more citizens living alone or in nuclear families. Mulderig emphasized that lack of opportunity and financial security further impedes adulthood. Half of the Arab youth population does not engage the job market since many youth cannot access education.
This in turn lowers their marriage prospects. The Arab world needs to produce almost 50 million new jobs to meet the needs of its youth workforce; however, governments have not followed through on promises for job creation. Officially, 26 percent of youth in the Middle East are unemployed, although Mulderig believes that the actual figure is higher. She also found that there is a 70 percent unemployment rate among young people with secondary education, suggesting that schooling does not necessarily lead to job opportunities.
In other words, youth employment is inversely related to education. However, in the greater Arab region, youth feel their aspirations are not being met and the international system is failing them.
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